FIRST DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS
THESE SUMMARIES ARE NEITHER APPROVED IN ADVANCE NOR ENDORSED BY THE COURT. THEY ARE NOT HEADNOTES OR SYLLABI. INTERESTED PARTIES SHOULD OBTAIN COPIES OF THE ACTUAL DECISIONS FROM THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
DATE: Wednesday, November 6, 2024
CAPTION: NORTON OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC. V. BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS, VILLAGE OF ST. BERNARD, OHIO
APPEAL NO.: C-230449
TRIAL NO.: A-1900066
KEY WORDS: R.C. CH. 2506 — ADMINSTRATIVE APPEAL — ZONING — JURISDICTION
SUMMARY: In this administrative appeal, the trial court did not err in upholding the decision of the appellee Board of Zoning Appeals to affirm a legal notice of violation that was issued to appellant for a violation of Section 1125.07 of the Village of St. Bernard’s Zoning Ordinance where appellant erected or constructed a sign in violation of Section 711.07(e) of the Village’s Codified Ordinances, and Section 711.07(e) was incorporated into the Zoning Ordinance through Section 1185.01(c).
The trial court did not err in finding that it lacked jurisdiction in an administrative appeal to address appellant’s facial constitutional challenge to Chapter 711 of the Village of St. Bernard’s Codified Ordinances where appellant does not dispute that it was seeking a general declaration as to the unconstitutionality of Chapter 711.
[See CONCURRENCE: Appellant would likely have prevailed on its challenge to the Board of Zoning Appeals’ decision had it raised the issue of nonconformity under Section 711.05(c) of the Village of St. Bernard’s Zoning Ordinance.]
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by ZAYAS, P.J.; CROUSE, J., CONCURS and KINSLEY, J., CONCURS SEPARATELY.
CAPTION: IJAKOLI V. ALUNGBE
APPEAL NOS.: C-230665, C-230673
TRIAL NO.: DR-1701029
KEY WORDS: DOMESTIC RELATIONS — CUSTODY MODIFICATION — BEST INTEREST – COMPENSATORY PARENTING TIME – VEXATIOUS LITIGATOR – WAIVER
SUMMARY: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant-father’s motion to modify the custody order because the trial court applied the correct legal standard and weighed the relevant best-interest factors, and the evidence shows that plaintiff-mother had provided support to help address their son’s behavioral and emotional issues, and defendant-father’s conduct contributed to a combative familial dynamic and negatively affected the children.
The appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant-father’s appeal of the trial court’s contempt decision after the trial court declared him a vexatious litigator and defendant-father was denied leave to institute an appeal of the contempt decision.
Defendant-father forfeited his challenge to the trial court’s vexatious-litigator declaration when he failed to oppose plaintiff-mother’s motion to declare him a vexatious litigator.
JUDGMENTS: AFFIRMED IN PART AND APPEALS DISMISSED IN PART
JUDGES: OPINION by BOCK, P.J.; CROUSE and WINKLER, JJ., CONCUR.
CAPTION: FINN V. SEISER
APPEAL NO.: C-240047
TRIAL NO.: A-2104036
KEY WORDS: SUMMARY JUDGMENT — MANIFEST WEIGHT — BREACH OF CONTRACT — SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE — IMPLIED DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
SUMMARY: The trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs sellers’ motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs’ claims as to whether defendants buyers breached the parties’ contract for the purchase of a home rested upon genuine disputes of material facts as to the condition of the home and the cause of water damage and rendered resolution at the summary judgment stage inappropriate.
The trial court’s finding that defendants buyers did not breach the parties’ contract was not against the manifest weight of the evidence as plaintiffs sellers failed to prove that they specifically performed under the terms of the contract.
The trial court’s finding that defendants buyers did not breach the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing was not against the manifest weight of the evidence as plaintiffs sellers failed to prove that defendants’ cancellation of the contract on the basis of insurance costs was not permitted under the contract.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by KINSLEY, J.; BERGERON, P.J., and WINKLER, J., CONCUR.
CAPTION: CINTRIFUSE LANDLORD, LLC V. PANINO, LLC
APPEAL NO.: C-240062
TRIAL NO.: A-2000757
KEY WORDS: SANCTIONS — R.C. 2323.51 — CIV.R.11 — UNNECSSARY DELAY
SUMMARY: The trial court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions against defendants and their counsel where the record lacked competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s determination that counsel’s day-of-trial request for a continuance to file an affidavit of disqualification was done for the improper purpose of causing unnecessary delay.
JUDGMENT: REVERSED
JUDGES: OPINION by ZAYAS, J.; BOCK, P.J., and CROUSE, J., CONCUR.
CAPTION: STATE V. DUNCAN
APPEAL NO.: C-240135
TRIAL NOS.: 23/TRC/8033/A/B
KEY WORDS: OVI – SUPPRESSION – WITNESSES – OFFICER TESTIMONY – PROBABLE CAUSE
SUMMARY: The trial court did not err when it held that the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant in partially denying her motion to suppress, as the officers had sufficient information that would lead a prudent person to believe that defendant was operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the officers to testify as to their observations of defendant throughout the administration of the field sobriety test, even though the results of the test were inadmissible, because the officers were permitted to testify as to mere observations, as any lay witness could.
The trial court’s judgment, convicting defendant of OVI, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence nor was there insufficient evidence to support it because even though some evidence weighed in defendant’s favor, the evidence did not heavily weigh against the judgment.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART AND APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART
JUDGES: OPINION by BERGERON, P.J.; CROUSE and WINKLER, JJ., CONCUR.
CAPTION: IN RE: E.K.
APPEAL NO.: C-240229
TRIAL NO.: 20/3585 X
KEY WORDS: JUVENILE COURT — SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION — R.C. 2152.02 — PAROLE VIOLATION — JUV.R. 9 — MOOT
SUMMARY: Where a person is adjudicated a delinquent child prior to attaining 18 years of age, the juvenile court has jurisdiction over the person for matters related to the adjudication until the person attains 21 years of age.
The juvenile court erred in dismissing a complaint for a parole violation on the ground that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the person that was the subject of the complaint where the person had not yet attained 21 years of age.
The juvenile court’s dismissal of a complaint for a parole violation could not be upheld pursuant to Juv.R. 9(A) where the juvenile court plainly dismissed the complaint based on a mistaken belief that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and where the dismissal was not based on a need to protect either the accused or the community or because the court believed that continuing with a prosecution of the parole violation was not in the accused’s best interest.
An appeal from the juvenile court’s dismissal of a complaint on jurisdictional grounds was not moot where a live controversy remained following a reversal of the jurisdictional determination and where the juvenile court could grant meaningful relief.
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED
JUDGES: OPINION by CROUSE, J.; BERGERON, P.J., and WINKLER, J., CONCUR.
CAPTION: IN RE: K.H.
APPEAL NOS.: C-240450, C-240519
TRIAL NO.: F/18/463 Z
KEY WORDS: PARENTAL TERMINATION – PERMANENT CUSTODY
SUMMARY: In appeals brought by mother and custody petitioner from the juvenile court’s decision to award permanent custody of the child to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services, the juvenile court’s decision was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the custody petition: the petitioner spent only a few weeks with the child shortly after his birth, mother’s mental-health and drug-addiction issues have prevented her from being able to effectively parent, and mother also had another child with whom her parental rights had been involuntarily terminated; the child is bonded to his foster parents.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by WINKLER, J.; BERGERON, P.J., and CROUSE, J., CONCUR.