FIRST DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS
THESE SUMMARIES ARE NEITHER APPROVED IN ADVANCE NOR ENDORSED BY THE COURT. THEY ARE NOT HEADNOTES OR SYLLABI. INTERESTED PARTIES SHOULD OBTAIN COPIES OF THE ACTUAL DECISIONS FROM THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
DATE: Friday, Janaury 31, 2025
CAPTION: clayborne v. mercedes-benz usa, llc
APPEAL No.: C-240098
TRIAL No.: A-2104241
KEY WORDS: Automobiles – lemon law – summary judgment – civ.r. 56 – Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act – Consumer Sales Practices Act – substantial impairment – warranties
SUMMARY: The belated repair of plaintiff’s vehicle by defendant automobile manufacturer’s authorized dealer is no defense to an otherwise-valid Lemon Law claim.
A reasonable jury could determine that plaintiff’s inability to start his vehicle by any normal means for hours at a time substantially impaired plaintiff’s use of the vehicle and therefore constituted a nonconformity, as that term is used under Ohio’s Lemon Law.
Where plaintiff’s evidence showed that his vehicle had been subject to unsuccessful repairs for a qualifying nonconformity on two occasions, but was successfully repaired on the third trip into the shop for that same issue, plaintiff’s vehicle did not qualify for the Lemon-Law presumption set forth in R.C. 1345.73(A)(1).
Because plaintiff’s evidence suggested that his vehicle had been in the shop to repair a qualifying nonconformity on 31 days in its first year of ownership, there were triable issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment for defendant on the issue of plaintiff’s entitlement to the Lemon-Law presumption set forth in R.C. 1345.73(A)(2).
The unfounded assertions in the affidavit of a local service manager stating that the dealer was delayed in repairing plaintiff’s car “due to COVID-19 supply chain problems” were not adequate evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic itself was the but-for cause of the delayed repairs, and defendant was therefore not entitled to summary judgment on its tolling defense under R.C. 1345.73(B)(1).
Where plaintiff introduced evidence that he could not start his vehicle on command, and that his vehicle had been subject to more than two repair attempts for that warrantied defect, disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act claim.
Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, because plaintiff introduced no evidence showing that defendant’s sales practices or warranty had been deceptive.
JUDGMENT: affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded
JUDGES: OPINION by Crouse, J.; BERGERON, P.J., and WINKLER, J., CONCUR.
CAPTION: Mt. Pleasant Blacktopping Co., Inc. v. inverness group, Inc.
APPEAL No.: C-240134
TRIAL No.: A-2102231
KEY WORDS: Collateral estoppel – motion to dismiss – civ.r. 12(B)(7) – joinder – Civ.R. 19 – declaratory judgment – R.C. 2721.12 – necessary parties – contracts – breach of contract – substantial performance – excuse – Security sewage – impossibility – regulatory impossibility – good faith – remedies – DAMAGES
SUMMARY: A prior determination by a federal court that a county regulation was not so “arbitrary and capricious” as to defy the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution did not collaterally estop plaintiff from litigating the entirely distinct issue of whether the county’s application of the same regulation was “arbitrary” and therefore unforeseeable, so as to excuse plaintiff’s contractual performance, regardless of similarities in terminology.
Where plaintiff, at most, sought a declaration challenging the application of a county’s regulations as improper under the regulations as-written, plaintiff was not challenging “the validity of a municipal ordinance” and therefore was not obligated to join the county as a necessary party under R.C. 2721.12 or Civ.R. 19, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss on those grounds under Civ.R. 12(B)(7).
Where, in a construction contract, promisor contracted to build a sewer line and obtain regulatory approval, but failed to receive such approval, and where conforming the installed line to regulations would increase the cost to promisee by roughly 30 percent, promisor’s construction of the unapproved sewer lines did not constitute substantial performance and so did not discharge promisor’s duties under the contract.
The trial court erred in excusing plaintiff’s failure to obtain regulatory approval (as required by contract) because of supervening and unforeseeable regulatory action under Security Sewage Equip. Co. v. McFerren, 14 Ohio St.2d 251 (1968), because the trial court did not also find that the regulatory action had rendered plaintiff’s promised performance impossible in the relevant legal sense, and that plaintiff had attempted in good faith to avoid the regulatory application by appeal or other means, both of which were required under the doctrine excusing nonperformance based on regulatory impossibility.
The trial court erred in awarding promisor breach-of-contract damages after holding that promisor’s nonperformance was excused by regulatory impossibility, because promisee’s duty to render reciprocal performance would have been discharged along with promisor’s excused duties, and because promisor’s monetary remedy under such circumstances, if any, would have been restitution in the amount of any uncompensated benefit conferred upon the promisee.
JUDGMENT: affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded
JUDGES: OPINION by Crouse, J.; BOCK, P.J., and WINKLER, J., CONCUR.