FIRST DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS
THESE SUMMARIES ARE NEITHER APPROVED IN ADVANCE NOR ENDORSED BY THE COURT. THEY ARE NOT HEADNOTES OR SYLLABI. INTERESTED PARTIES SHOULD OBTAIN COPIES OF THE ACTUAL DECISIONS FROM THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
DATE: Wednesday, May 1, 2024
CAPTION: STATE V. COOK
APPEAL NO.: C-230235
TRIAL NO.: B-2002132
KEY WORDS: FELONIOUS ASSAULT – R.C. 2901.11(A)(1) – INTENT – KNOWINGLY – R.C. 2901.22(B) – EXPERT TESTIMONY – CREDIBILITY
SUMMARY: Defendant’s conviction for felonious assault is supported by sufficient evidence because a rational trier of fact could find that defendant’s testimony describing her decision to drive across the parking lot and surveillance footage showing defendant striking the victim with her car established that defendant acted knowingly.
Defendant’s conviction for felonious assault is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because although defendant presented expert testimony that she had operated her vehicle as a flight reaction to an attack, the trial court was entitled to find that expert testimony not credible and undermined by surveillance footage in the record.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by BOCK, P.J.; WINKLER and KINSLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
CAPTION: EDJE V. HOLMES
APPEAL NO.: C-230286
TRIAL NO.: DR-2200117
KEY WORDS: DIVORCE — DIVISION OF PROPERTY — SPOUSAL SUPPORT — ATTORNEY FEES – R.C. 3105.171 — R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) – R.C. 3105.73
SUMMARY: In a divorce case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded wife the entire equity of real property purchased during the marriage where the court considered husband’s financial contribution to the down payment and costs but found that husband financially abandoned wife and unfairly burdened her with financial obligations related to the real property.
In a divorce case where the husband failed to file transcripts with his objections to the magistrate’s decision, the trial court did not fail to consider husband’s legal arguments when his objections were primarily fact-based and he failed to cite any law in support of his claims.
The trial court’s award of attorney fees to wife was reasonable where the magistrate found that husband failed to comply with discovery requests and mandatory disclosures in a timely manner.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by BOCK, P.J.; WINKLER and KINSLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
CAPTION: SCHRAM V. MASADEH
APPEAL NOS.: C-230352, C-230357
TRIAL NO.: A-2104070
KEY WORDS: DISCOVERY – ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE – MOTION TO COMPEL – FINAL ORDER – R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)
SUMMARY: Where defendant, a managing member of one company and a 50-percent member of another company, did not meet his burden of establishing that he was asserting the attorney-client privilege in the best interests of the companies rather than on his own behalf, the trial court did not err in granting a motion to compel documents that defendant alleged were privileged.
Where a trial court’s interlocutory order concerning discovery of a privileged matter is a final order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), an appellate court’s review is limited to matters concerning the discovery of privileged material.
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
JUDGES: OPINION by CROUSE, J.; ZAYAS, P.J., and KINSLEY, J., CONCUR.
CAPTION: IN RE A.C., A MINOR CHILD
APPEAL NOS.: C-230359, C-230360, C-230361
TRIAL NOS.: 19-005532X, 19-003199X, 19-003198X
KEY WORDS: JUVENILE — JURISDICTION — FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER — R.C. 2505.02 — PLEA AGREEMENT
SUMMARY: Because judicial release hearings are special proceedings and the state’s substantial right of enforcement of its plea agreements was affected by the juvenile court’s order granting the juvenile’s motion for early judicial release, the state sought leave to appeal from final appealable orders under R.C. 2505.02(B) where the state and the juvenile had entered into a plea agreement whereby the juvenile court was prohibited from granting early judicial release from the Department of Youth Services and the court had granted the juvenile’s motion for early judicial release.
Where the juvenile court was not a party to the plea agreement, it was free to grant the juvenile early judicial release in contravention of the plea agreement. [But see DISSENT: The juvenile court erred in granting judicial release because A.C. entered into a binding plea agreement with the state where he agreed to serve the entire term of his juvenile disposition, effectively waiving his eligibility for judicial release.]
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by KINSLEY, J.; ZAYAS, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART and CROUSE, J., CONCURS.