FIRST DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS
THESE SUMMARIES ARE NEITHER APPROVED IN ADVANCE NOR ENDORSED BY THE COURT. THEY ARE NOT HEADNOTES OR SYLLABI. INTERESTED PARTIES SHOULD OBTAIN COPIES OF THE ACTUAL DECISIONS FROM THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
DATE: Wednesday, July 24, 2024
CAPTION: STATE V. GILL
APPEAL NO.: C-230520
TRIAL NO.: B-2005012
KEY WORDS: MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE – CRIM.R. 8 – JOINDER – MOOTNESS – APP.R. 16 – APP.R. 12 – REAGAN TOKES – R.C. 2929.19 – R.C. 2929.14 – SENTENCING – CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES – TRAFFICKING IN DRUGS – POSSESSION OF DRUGS – ALLIED OFFENSES – MERGER – FIREARM SPECIFICATION – MAJOR-DRUG-OFFENDER SPECIFICATION – R.C. 2941.1410 – MOTION TO SUPPRESS – RIGHT TO COUNSEL – CONSENT – PROTECTIVE SWEEP – SEARCH AND SEIZURE
SUMMARY: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for a continuance to obtain an independent lab test of the drugs recovered during a search of his apartment where defendant waited approximately two-and-a-half years after receiving a discovery report regarding the drugs to request the continuance, defendant had already been granted multiple continuances, and a jury was waiting to report to the courtroom.
Defendant’s assignment of error challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion for relief from prejudicial joinder was moot where the court had effectively granted the motion and accorded defendant the relief requested by subsequently continuing for trial only the charges that defendant sought to bifurcate.
Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2), an appellate court may disregard an assignment of error where an appellant fails to provide an argument in support of the assignment in the appellate brief as required by App.R. 16(A)(7).
Where the trial court provided the Reagan Tokes notifications required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) at the plea phase of a joint plea-and-sentencing hearing, the trial court complied with the requirement that it provide the required notifications to an offender at sentencing.
The trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences without making the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C).
The trial court erred in imposing separate sentences on multiple groups of allied offenses of similar import, specifically trafficking in heroin and possession of heroin, trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine, trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound and possession of a fentanyl-related compound, and aggravated trafficking in drugs and aggravated possession of drugs.
The trial court erred in imposing separate sentences for multiple firearm specifications where the felonies to which the specifications were attached were part of the same act or transaction.
An additional prison term may only be imposed for a major-drug-offender specification when the drug involved is a fentanyl-related compound or mixture thereof.
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(11), a trial court may only impose one additional prison term on an offender for a major-drug-offender specification when the underlying felonies were committed as part of the same act.
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress where, even if defendant had clearly and unambiguously invoked the right to counsel, defendant reinitiated a dialogue with the interviewing detectives and evinced a willingness and desire to discuss the investigation.
Where the totality of the circumstances established that consent to search was voluntarily given and was not the result of coercion, and where consent was not tainted by a protective sweep of the premises to be searched prior to consent being obtained, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part, sentences reversed in part, and cause remanded
JUDGES: OPINION by crouse, J.; ZAYAS, P.J., and WINKLER, J., CONCUR.
CAPTION: STATE V. DAVIS
APPEAL NOS.: C-240014, C-240015
TRIAL NOS.: B-2206086, B-2303433
KEY WORDS: GUILTY PLEA – CRIM.R. 11
SUMMARY: Defendant’s guilty pleas were made voluntarily where defendant repeatedly assured the court that he wanted to accept the plea agreement and confirmed that the pleas were not induced by any threats or promises.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by ZAYAS, J.; BOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., CONCUR.
CAPTION: IN RE: P, S, M CHILDREN
APPEAL NO.: C-240251
TRIAL NO: F20-449X
KEY WORDS: PARENTAL TERMINATION – BEST INTEREST
SUMMARY: Former R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) set forth a list of circumstances that, if all were found to exist, mandated a finding that permanent custody was in the best interest of the children; even assuming that one of the conditions was not met, the trial court considered all of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and properly determined under those factors that a grant of permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was in the children’s best interest.
Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that mother had abandoned her children when the evidence showed that mother did not contact or visit her children for several months after their removal from the home due to mother’s drug abuse and then for nine months while she was incarcerated, even though mother started visiting the two youngest children after she was released from prison.
The juvenile court did not err in finding that a grant of permanent custody was in the children’s best interest when the evidence showed that despite some progress, mother still had problems with sobriety, housing and mental health, and therefore, she had not remedied the conditions that caused the children to be removed from the home and she could not provide a legally secure placement for them.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by WINKLER, J.; BERGERON, P.J., and CROUSE, J., CONCUR.