FIRST DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS
THESE SUMMARIES ARE NEITHER APPROVED IN ADVANCE NOR ENDORSED BY THE COURT. THEY ARE NOT HEADNOTES OR SYLLABI. INTERESTED PARTIES SHOULD OBTAIN COPIES OF THE ACTUAL DECISIONS FROM THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
DATE: Tuesday, December 31, 2024
CAPTION: TWANG V. CITY OF CINCINNATI
APPEAL NO.: C-230531
TRIAL NO.: A-2301308
KEY WORDS: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT — PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION — EVIDENCE — EXPERT REPORT —DUE PROCESS – NOTICE – HEARING – IRREPARABLE HARM –
SUMMARY: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded plaintiff’s experts from testifying at the preliminary-injunction hearing because plaintiff disclosed the identify of its experts to the defendants without providing an expert report two days before the hearing and plaintiff rejected the trial court’s offer to continue the hearing to produce expert reports.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff property owner’s request for a preliminary injunction because plaintiff property owner (1) failed to establish a likelihood that it would prevail on the merits of its claims that defendant municipality failed to apprise and afford plaintiff property owner a predeprivation hearing in violation of plaintiff property owner’s rights because defendant municipality informed plaintiff property owner of its intent to repair a building on plaintiff property owner’s real property more than 30 days before beginning the repairs, plaintiff property owner failed to appeal the initial orders and notices of violations of the unsafe conditions and plaintiff property owner was afforded an informal predeprivation hearing with defendant municipality, and defendant municipality’s notices reflect emergency circumstances necessitating prompt action; (2) any depreciation in value of plaintiff property owner’s real property caused by the repairs does not rise to irreparable harm when the plaintiff property owner desires to sell or demolish the historic structure on the property; (3) enjoining the repair of a deteriorating structure is contrary to third-party interests when the repairs would protect innocent pedestrians from the threat of falling debris; and (4) the public’s interest in preserving historic structures weighs against enjoining the repairs of a structure located in a historic district.
The appellate court will not create an argument in support of an assignment of error where the appellant fails to develop one as required by App.R. 16(A)(7).
JUDGMENTS: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by BOCK, P.J.; CROUSE and WINKLER, JJ., CONCUR.
CAPTION: PAQUIN V. CITY OF INDIAN HILL
APPEAL NO.: C-240146
TRIAL NOS.: A-2201397, A-2201398
KEY WORDS: R.C. CH. 2506 — ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL — LEGISLATIVE ACTION — MOOTNESS — LAND USE
SUMMARY: The trial court lacked jurisdiction to review a noise regulation adopted by the Indian Hill City Council in a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, because the city council’s action was primarily legislative rather than administrative. [But see DISSENT: The trial court did not lack jurisdiction to review the decision of the Council of the City of the Village of Indian Hill, Ohio, where the decision was administrative in nature and the ultimate product of quasi-judicial proceedings.]
The trial court’s R.C. Ch. 2506 review of the Indian Hill City Council’s enactment of a tent resolution allowing a historic wedding venue to erect a semi-permanent tent during the 2022 wedding season is not moot, given that the issues presented by the tent resolution are capable of repetition but evading review.
The trial court erred as a matter of law in interpreting the phrase “sponsored by groups” to prohibit outdoor weddings; the phrase means that two or more individuals must plan an event for a unifying purpose, a standard that all weddings necessarily satisfy. [But see DISSENT: The trial court correctly interpreted the 1980 authorization as limiting the estate’s use of the house and grounds “for meetings and other occasions sponsored by groups other than the Junior League, of a non-commercial nature.”]
The trial court erred as a matter of law in interpreting the phrase “non-commercial” to prohibit the receipt of revenue; in the context of the Indian Hill zoning ordinance, the term “non-commercial” means “non-profit.” [But see DISSENT: This court need not reach the issue of whether the trial court correctly determined that the events held at the estate were commercial in nature where the record supports that the estate was not limiting the use of its grounds to events “sponsored by groups,” as contemplated in the 1980 authorization.]
JUDGMENT: VACATED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CAUSE REMANDED
JUDGES: OPINION by KINSLEY, J.; BERGERON, J., CONCURS and ZAYAS, P.J., DISSENTS.
CAPTION: state v. walker
APPEAL Nos.: C-240224, C-240225, C-240226
TRIAL Nos.: b-2303205, b-2003478, b-2302148-B
KEY WORDS: Sufficiency – evidence – crim.r. 11 – guilty pleas – plea colloquy – sentencing – r.c. 2953.08 – appellate review/criminal
SUMMARY: Where a criminal defendant pleads guilty to a felony indictment, the State need not provide a factual “explanation of the circumstances” at his plea hearing, and if the State does offer such an explanation, defendant cannot seek to reverse his conviction based on its factual insufficiency.
Where the trial court misstated defendant’s maximum aggregate sentence as nine, rather than seven, years during the guilty-plea colloquy, and where defendant failed to explain why correction of the trial court’s error would have affected his decision to plead guilty, and where defendant stated on the record that he pled guilty because he was promised no jail time, defendant failed to show that the trial court’s misstatement prejudiced him.
Under R.C. 2953.08(A)(4) and 2953.08(G)(2)(b), a court of appeals may not reweigh the sentencing factors and mitigation evidence to review a sentencing court’s application of the purposes in R.C. 2912.11 and factors in R.C. 2912.12.
A court of appeals presumes that a trial court has properly considered the purposes of sentencing in R.C. 2912.11 and sentencing factors in R.C. 2912.12, and the trial court’s silence on those purposes and factors does not rebut that presumption.
JUDGMENTS: affirmed
JUDGES: OPINION by Crouse, J.; BERGERON, P.J., and WINKLER, J., CONCUR.
CAPTION: DEXTER V. FAIRFIELD
APPEAL NO.: C-240249
TRIAL NO.: DR-1902284
KEY WORDS: CIVIL CONTEMPT – APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL FINAL APPEALBLE ORDER ABUSE OF DISCRETION – PARENTING COORDINATOR POST-DECREE MOTIONS – ATTORNEY FEES
SUMMARY: While generally a ruling on a contempt motion does not constitute a final order absent a finding of contempt and the imposition of sanctions, domestic-relations matters are a special category of contempt cases and a possibility of prejudice exists when a contempt motion is directed at a party to the action, and therefore, the trial court’s order denying mother’s motion for contempt against father is a final, appealable order.
The trial court did not err in denying mother’s motion for contempt against father where, while it was undisputed that father had engaged in a pattern of late payments over contested expenses, the trial court was empowered to determine the kind and character of conduct that constitutes contempt and the trial court’s decision granting or denying a motion for contempt will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
The trial court did not err in denying mother’s motion for reallocation of parenting-coordinator fees where the parenting coordinator testified that issues regarding expenses were secondary and easier to address than other issues such as medication and therapy, and the court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion.
The trial court did not err in denying mother’s motion for attorney fees where, even though father failed to reimburse mother for expense in a timely manner, the court relied on other factors in ruling on the motion, and its decision was not an abuse of discretion.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by WINKLER, J.; BOCK, P.J., and CROUSE, J., CONCUR.